Merrick Garland vs. State of Georgia

Merrick Garland, Joe Biden's Attorney General, has filed a lawsuit against the State of Georgia. The lawsuit asserts that "the state is violating federal law by inhibiting voting rights on the basis of race." On Friday at the DOJ, Garland said "Recent changes to Georgia's election laws were enacted with the purpose of denying or abridging the right of Black Georgians to vote on account of their race or color, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act."

Garland continued, saying "Several studies show that Georgia experienced record voter turnout and participation rates in the 2020 election cycle. Approximately two-thirds of eligible voters in the state cast a ballot in the November election, just over the national average. This is cause for celebration. But then in March of 2021, Georgia's legislature passed SB 202. Many of that law's provisions make it harder for people to vote."

Left out of Garland's statement is the fact that increased the number of early voting days, the number of hours early voting locations would be open while mandating an increase in the number of drop boxes throughout the state.

At his announcement, Garland said Georgia's SB202 bill was enacted with the intent of "denying or abridging the right to vote on accout of race or color."

This is a joke lawsuit because it's virtually impossible to prove intent. Without proving that, the rest of Garland's claims fall flat. What proof will Garland provide that show this new bill restricts people from voting in an election still to be held?

Further, Georgia will argue that provisions in their bill are meant to increase election integrity. Since the Supreme Court's Crawford v. Marion County Election Board ruling, in which Associate Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the majority opinion, election integrity is a legitimate limitation. Here's what Justice Stevens wrote:

In neither Norman nor Burdick did we identify any litmus test for measuring the severity of a burden that a state law imposes on a political party, an individual voter, or a discrete class of voters. However slight that burden may appear, as Harper demonstrates, it must be justified by relevant and legitimate state interests “sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation.” Norman, 502 U. S.,at 288–289. We therefore begin our analysis of the con-stitutionality of Indiana’s statute by focusing on those interests.

The State has identified several state interests that arguably justify the burdens that SEA 483 imposes on voters and potential voters. While petitioners argue that the statute was actually motivated by partisan concerns and dispute both the significance of the State’s interests and the magnitude of any real threat to those interests, they do not question the legitimacy of the interests the State has identified. Each is unquestionably relevant to the State’s interest in protecting the integrity and reliability of the electoral process.

The first is the interest in deterring and detecting voter fraud. The State has a valid interest in participating in a nationwide effort to improve and modernize election procedures that have been criticized as antiquated and inefficient.9 The State also argues that it has a particular interest in preventing voter fraud in response to a problem that is in part the product of its own maladministration—namely, that Indiana’s voter registration rolls include a large number of names of persons who are either deceased or no longer live in Indiana. Finally, the State relies on its interest in safeguarding voter confidence. Each of these interests merits separate comment.

This lawsuit isn't going anywhere, especially considering the Crawford decision.